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INTRODUCTION
If you knew you would inherit millions of dollars as long as you
married someone Jewish, would you scour the Synagogue next Friday
night?
This was the situation Daniel Shapira faced. Daniel was a twenty-
one-year-old undergraduate at Youngstown State University when his fa-
ther, Mr. Shapira, died.1 Mr. Shapira conditioned a portion of his large
fortune to Daniel: the document read either be “married at the time of my
death to a Jewish girl whose both parents were Jewish . . .” or the inheri-
tance will go to “the State of Israel.”2 In the United States, unlike in
other countries, a decedent has almost full control over the distribution of
his assets upon death.3 Mr. Shapira used his power to incentivize his son
to adhere to family values and marry within the Jewish faith.
Many parents view the distribution of their assets at death as the
final impact they have on their children. Historically, most parents took
this opportunity to provide future financial security for their heirs.4 To-
day, parents are confronting a recently developed fear of their children
inheriting too much.5 This fear leads to a controlling dynamic between
parents’ fortunes and their children’s lives.6 Scholars relate the situation
to the “carrot and the stick” analogy7, by which parents incentivize their
children—many times adult children—to make wise choices by dangling
a “carrot” in front of their children, then string them along like a master-
ful puppeteer.
1 See Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1974).
2 Id. at 826.
3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
cmt. e (Am. Law Inst. 2003). “The organizing principle of the American law of donative
transfers is freedom of disposition. Property owners have the nearly unrestricted right to dis-
pose of their property as they please . . . . “
4 Richard I. Kirkland Jr., Should You Leave It All to the Children? FORTUNE MAGAZINE,
Sept. 29, 1986, http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1986/09/29/
68098/index.htm.
5 Id.
6 Jon J. Gallo, Use and Abuse of Incentive Trusts: Improvements and Alternatives, ¶
1100 (2011) (on file with The Madison Group Inc.), http://www.themadisongroup.com/Resour
ces/Use%20and%20Abuse20of%20Incentive%20Trusts% 20%20Gallo.pdf. John Gallo
“chairs the Family Wealth Practice Group of Greenberg Glusker Fields Claman & Machtinger,
LLP, in Los Angeles.” He is also “the author of more than 70 articles on estate planning . . . a
Fellow of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel, an Academician of the Interna-
tional Academy of Estate and Trust Law and certified by the California Board of Legal Spe-
cialization as a Specialist in Probate, Estate Planning and Trust Law.” Id.
7 Id.
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Courtesy of American inheritance law, children can be disinherited
by their parents.8 The harsh consequences of complete disinheritance
have led to the development of conditional bequests—parents will give
inheritances to their children so long as their children behave properly.9
The most prevalent form of a conditioned inheritance is the “incentive
trust.”10 An incentive trust allows parents to condition distributions of
trust property.11 These conditions are “as unlimited as our imagina-
tion,”12 so long as they do not contradict public policy or call for benefi-
ciaries to break the law.13 Theoretically, this solves a “parent’s final
dilemma”—whether to pass wealth on to children and possibly stunt mo-
tivation and character,14 or leave children less inheritance, but instead,
helpful principles and inspiration. Incentive trusts allow parents to do
both by separating the benefits of bequeathing property to children from
the risks of bequeathing too much property. This is done by passing for-
tunes only after children align their lives with criteria enumerated in the
trust.
However, incentive trusts are not a perfect solution and should be
used with caution in estate planning. Incentive trust shortcomings are
fourfold. First, incentive trusts are inflexible, making them difficult to
draft and leaving them exposed to litigation.15 Second, the law confers a
public policy limitation that produces inconsistent enforcement of incen-
tive trusts.16 Third, incentive trusts promote idolizing money, thus poten-
tially diluting the initial incentivized behavior.17 Fourth, rewarding
children with money often has a negative impact on their motivation.18
Part I of this Note discusses both the development of the law regard-
ing inheritance and the growing attraction to incentive trusts. Part II de-
tails the four traps of incentive trusts—inflexibility, public policy
limitations, unintended consequences, decreased motivation—and opens
the door for a new solution to a parent’s final dilemma. Part III examines
four principles for crafting a better solution to the parent’s final dilemma
by looking at those who have successfully inspired children without in-
8 JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT SITKOFF, WILLS TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 564 (10th ed.
2017). “In all states except Louisiana, a child or other descendant has no statutory protection
against intentional disinheritance by a parent.”
9 Id. at 9.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 10.
12 AUSTIN W. SCOTT & MARK L. ASCHER, SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 1.1. (5th ed.
2015).
13 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 (Am. Law Inst. 2003).
14 Gallo, supra note 6.
15 Infra Part III.A.
16 Infra Part III.B.
17 Infra Part III.C.
18 Infra Part III.D.
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centive trusts. Part IV proposes the new solution, termed a Hidden Bonus
Trust, that avoids the identified traps of incentive trusts and incorporates
the lessons from experts.
I. WHOEVER HAS THE GOLD MAKES THE RULES19
There is a lot to consider before death. To some, passing down an
inheritance is least of their worries; to others, passing down a legacy is
everything. The United States has settled on allowing people to choose
what happens to their property when they die.20 This method lets people
provide for beneficiaries from “beyond the grave.”21 Recognizing that
unconditional inheritance windfalls can lead beneficiaries down a road of
destruction, incentive trusts emerged as a vehicle to both leave a legacy
and regulate beneficiaries’ behavior.22
A. Beyond the Grave
Though passing down family assets through wills has long been a
common practice,23 today it can be a convoluted process of disinheri-
tance, hiding assets, and controlling beneficiaries from beyond the
grave.24 This evolution is unique to American inheritance laws, which
dared parents and lawyers to push the boundaries of after-death asset
distribution.25
Purchase, sale, and gift are all forms of property transfer recognized
in a majority of jurisdictions around the world—at least while the trans-
feror is living.26 Laws governing transfers of property after death are
unique in the United States because they extend control of property
through death.27 Whether this is the best way to promote orderly succes-
sion is a topic of scholarly debate.28 Alternative methods include “forced
succession” or “confiscation by the state.”29 Under a forced succession
scheme, property passes after death by a set of mandatory rules that vary
by jurisdiction.30 Mandatory rules might include primogeniture, in which
the property is split between a living spouse and children, other depen-
19 J. Peder Zane, Ideas and Trends: The Rise of Incentive Trusts; Six Feet Under and
Overbearing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1985 (calling incentive trusts a “modern version of the
Golden Rule”).
20 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 8, at 3, 19.
21 Id. at 2.
22 See id. at 9.
23 See id. at 4.
24 See generally id. at 519–85.
25 SCOTT & ASCHER, supra note 12.
26 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 8, at 3–4.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 19.
29 Id.
30 See generally id. at 65.
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dents, or kin.31 Forced succession is most notably used when someone
dies without a will, dying intestate.32 Confiscation by the state is based
on the theory that property rights terminate at death; therefore, property
should be recovered by the government.33
The United States settled on the theory called “freedom of disposi-
tion,” sometimes referred to as “dead hand control.”34 There are three
main policy reasons behind freedom of disposition.35 First, it promotes
work and savings.36 Social scientists believe that the right to bequeath
property at death leads people to work harder during life and save what
they earn.37 Therefore, if freedom of disposition were eliminated, the
subjective value of property would decline because the potential use of
giving property away at death “disappeared.”38 Second, freedom of dis-
position gives the elderly leverage to receive social services from their
potential heirs.39 Potential beneficiaries want to provide care and comfort
to their elders in an effort to ensure they are not left out of the estate
plan.40 Finally, people assert that they know more about their families’
needs than the legislature or courts do.41 The American perspective ad-
vocates for a parent’s right to disinherit children or condition inheritance
in any way that promotes the needs of the family.
Upon these principles, dead hand control has become the corner-
stone of American inheritance law,42 but dead hand control is not bound-
less.43 There are a few situations where one’s estate plan can be
disrupted.44 For instance, if a person dies with creditors, the creditors can
settle debt before any property is given to beneficiaries.45 Also, as codi-
fied by some legislatures, disinherited spouses may have rights to their
31 Id. at 19.
32 Id. at 65.
33 Id. at 19. Confiscation by the state was the method implemented by the Soviet Bol-
sheviks in an attempt to carry out the teachings of Karl Marx. Within four years, this practice
was ended because the Soviet government determined that allowing disposition of property at
death encouraged savings and provided an incentive to work. Also, if descendants were not
being provided for after a parent’s death, the burden then fell on the state.
34 Id. at 3.
35 See generally Adam J. Hirsh & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead
Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 18 (1992).
36 Id. at 8.
37 Id.
38 Critics contend that the productivity benefits are offset by lazy beneficiaries who in-
herit, rather than create their own wealth. Id.
39 Id. at 9–10.
40 Id. at 10.
41 Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifica-
tion, 82 FORDHAM L. Rev. 1125, 1136–37 (2013).
42 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 8, at 386.
43 Id. at 519.
44 Id. at 3.
45 Id. at 461–62.
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dead spouse’s estate.46 In part due to obstacles like these, trust laws de-
veloped as a way to protect assets and further customize bequests to the
next generation.
Trusts originated as, and in some instances continue to be, a finan-
cial vehicle to circumvent the law.47 Their origins are traced back to the
mid-thirteenth century when Franciscan friars migrated to England and
were not legally allowed to own land.48 At that time, benefactors trans-
ferred land to friends of the friars to hold for the sole benefit of the
friars.49 People then began using the same mechanism to avoid other
laws, such as primogeniture and taxes.50 Indeed, they were so effective at
eluding property laws that King Henry VIII pressured Parliament to pass
more laws because of declining tax revenue.51 Even so, people continued
to find loopholes in the new laws, giving birth to the modern-day trust.52
Today, trusts are used for a multitude of reasons. Many trusts serve
useful purposes in estate planning, businesses, and charitable giving.53
On the other hand, trusts can be used to hide assets from creditors,
spouses, and tax authorities, and to control beneficiaries from beyond the
grave.54
B. Incentive Trusts
“The rich have—at least in Anglo American history—continually
sought ways to secure their wealth to their children and grandchildren
against the accidents of fortune, bad management, and irresponsible
spending.”55 Nowhere else in the world is self-made wealth so highly
sought-after; and consequently, no culture is more suspicious that the
“silver spoon contains something vaguely narcotic.”56 As a result, incen-
tive trusts were formed as a tool to leave a meaningful legacy while en-
suring beneficiaries do not waste it.57
46 Id. at 520.
47 See id. at 386.
48 Id. at 385.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 387.
51 Id.
52 Id. The medieval trust was called a “use.” In 1535, British parliament passed the Stat-
ute of Uses, which is still enacted in all common law states today. The purpose of this statute
was to completely abolish uses; however, the courts eventually held that the statute did not
operate if the trustee (medieval “feoffee”) was given active duties to perform. For this reason,
“passive trusts”, wherein the trustee has no duties to perform, are invalid today. Id.
53 Id. at 385.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 696.
56 Kirkland, supra note 4.
57 See generally Gallo, supra note 6, ¶ 1100.
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Curtis L. Carlson is the founder of the Radisson Hotel Corp. and the
TGI Fridays restaurant franchise.58 Carlson amassed a net worth over
$700 million in his career and said, “There’s nothing people like me
worry about more—how the hell do we keep our money from destroying
our kids.”59 This line of thinking stems from quantitative data revealing
how quickly family fortunes evaporate.60 Time Magazine published a
study finding that “70% of high net worth families lose their wealth by
the second generation, and a stunning 90% by the third.”61 U.S. Trust, a
Bank of America subsidiary, recently surveyed individuals whose net
worth exceeded $3 million dollars in investable assets.62 The survey
found that “78% feel that the next generation is not financially responsi-
ble enough to handle inheritance,” citing that with a substantial inheri-
tance, their children will become “lazy and entitled.”63 Due to this fear, a
majority of people surveyed said they “disclose little to nothing about
their wealth to their children,”64 an ominous harbinger of risk, discussed
infra. Further, the study showed that it takes the average recipient of an
inheritance “nineteen days until they buy a new car.”65
In the midst of this mess, estate planning shifted from a tool to pass
on wealth and take care of earthly responsibilities to an instrument used
to continue parenting. Rather than a gift that is administered at one pe-
riod in time, trusts create an on-going scheme of property disbursements
tailored to the perceived needs of beneficiaries.66 By setting conditions
that must be met before beneficiaries can receive trust disbursements, a
settlor provides safety nets for willing beneficiaries, while pushing them
towards future achievement.67 Of course, such a safety net will only exist
so long as the beneficiaries are willing to trudge down the path the settlor
laid out for them.
Traditional conditions used by incentive trusts can be divided into
three categories: conditions that encourage beneficiaries to pursue an ed-
58 Kirkland, supra note 4.
59 Id. Curtis Carlson died in 1999 with two adult daughters. His eldest daughter took
over as CEO of the family business, and he named his youngest daughter President of the
Carlson Family Foundation. Rather than grapple with inheritance dilemmas, Carlson decided
to guide his daughters’ inheritance mindset by establishing a family charitable mission. See
generally Kevyn Burger, The Legacy Continues: Minnesota Legacy Families Maintain Their
Dedication to Local Philanthropy, MINNESOTA BUSINESS, Apr. 22, 2016, http://minnesotabusi-
ness.com/legacy-continues.
60 See Chris Taylor, 70% of Rich Families Lose Their Wealth by the Second Generation,
TIME: MONEY, June 17, 2015, http://time.com/money/3925308/rich-families-lose-wealth/.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 SCOTT & ASCHER, supra note 12.
67 See id.; a “settlor” is a person who “settles” property in a trust.
40749-cjp_28-1 Sheet No. 54 Side B      11/30/2018   10:47:34
40749-cjp_28-1 Sheet No. 54 Side B      11/30/2018   10:47:34
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\28-1\CJP104.txt unknown Seq: 8 28-NOV-18 13:32
100 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 28:93
ucation; conditions that provide incentives reflecting the settlor’s moral,
religious, or particular way of life; and conditions designed to motivate
beneficiaries to establish productive careers.68 A fourth category some-
times observed is a condition to discourage certain behaviors perceived
as destructive or immoral, like the use of drugs or alcohol.69 On the sur-
face, incentive trusts appear to be a perfect way to leave a meaningful
legacy while simultaneously ensuring that beneficiaries do not become
“wastrels or wantons.”70 Yet, the actual effects demonstrate this is not
the case.71 In practice, incentive trusts fail because of inflexibility, public
policy limitations, the unintended consequences they promote, and defi-
cient motivation.72
II. THEY CAN’T TAKE IT WITH THEM, BUT THEY WON’T LET IT GO73
Incentive trusts have become an integral part of estate planning,74
but have given rise to many problems75 and should be used with caution.
In theory, the appeal of incentive trusts is to ease parents’ fears about
wasteful children and offer a chance to implant values from beyond the
grave.76 In practice, these perceived advantages prove illusory and create
problems for all parties involved: drafting attorneys, settlors, and benefi-
ciaries.77 Rather than doing a disservice to settlors who deal with the
shortcomings of incentive trusts, there needs to be a different solution to
the parent’s final dilemma. A new solution needs to address the four
shortcomings that defect incentive trusts—inflexibility,78 public policy
limitations,79 unintended consequences,80 and ineffective motivation.81
A. Inflexibility
Flexibility in trust drafting is a perceived strength, but when it
comes to incentive trusts, there is limited flexibility in trust administra-
68 Joshua C. Tate, Conditional Love: Incentive Trusts and the Inflexibility Problem, 41
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 445, 453 (2006).
69 See Ellen Whiting, Controlling Behavior by Controlling the Inheritance: Considera-
tions in Drafting Incentive Provisions, REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 6, 8 (SEPT./OCT. 2001).
70 Kirkland, supra note 4.
71 See generally Gallo, supra note 6, ¶ 1102.1.
72 Id.
73 Zane, supra note 19.
74 Id.
75 See generally Gallo, supra note 6, ¶ 1102.1.
76 See David H. Lenok, The Dangerous Allure of Incentive Trusts, WEALTH MANAGE-
MENT, Sept. 15, 2015, http://www.wealthmanagement.com/estate-planning/dangerous-allure-
incentive-trusts.
77 See infra Part III.A, B, C, D.
78 See Gallo, supra note 6, ¶ 1103.
79 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 (Am. Law Inst. 2003).
80 Zane, supra note 19.
81 Gallo, supra note 6, ¶ 1102.
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tion.82 Incentive trusts are designed to imitate the thought process of a
living person.83 Just as a living person might reward a family member for
achieving specific milestones, incentive trusts create benchmarks that
beneficiaries must achieve before receiving payments.84 However, while
a living person can adjust the distribution scheme to accommodate un-
foreseen circumstances, the dead cannot.85 The inflexibility of incentive
trusts creates two woeful outcomes for settlors and the attorneys who
draft such trusts. First, trusts must be administered by the words written
in the trust agreement.86 Unless settlors and their attorneys can predict
the future, changed circumstances or different interpretations can twist
the objectives of the trust. Second, an overlooked or unforeseen circum-
stance can lead to litigation in which beneficiaries seek to hold the draft-
ing attorney liable, thus decreasing the value of the estate.87
1. Predicting the Future: Specificity vs. Flexibility
When settlors are alive, they can state their intentions clearly and
“respond to changes in circumstances or be persuaded to another course
of action.”88 However, once they die, administration is strictly governed
by what was written in the trust agreement, not the settlor’s spoken direc-
tions.89 Predicting all the different circumstances that could affect the
trust is near impossible.90 To be “enforceable, effective and satisfying to
the client, the distribution requirements would ideally be drafted with a
certain degree of specificity.”91 This creates a catch-22 for attorneys who
must reconcile specificity with flexibility. Incentive trusts are adminis-
tered in accordance with specific metrics, making them inflexible and
unlikely to “stand the test of time and remain functional in the face of
changing laws and social attitudes. . . .”92 Given that specificity and flex-
ibility are conflicting ideas, attorneys drafting incentive trusts must favor
one over the other. Therefore, staying true to the settlor’s intentions often
requires trustees to either interpret ambiguous language in the trust
agreement or guess how the settlor would have responded to the chang-
ing circumstances.93
82 See Lenok, supra note 76.
83 See Gallo, supra note 6, ¶ 1103.
84 See id.
85 Zane, supra note 19.
86 See Lenok, supra note 76.
87 See Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583 (Ca. 1961); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (Am. Law Inst. 2000).
88 Zane, supra note 19.
89 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 8, at 591.
90 See generally Tate, supra note 68.
91 Lenok, supra note 76.
92 Id.
93 See generally Gallo, supra note 6, ¶ 1103.
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From the four main categories of incentive trusts,94 two in particular
often lead to specific provisions that are harmfully inflexible in practice,
encouraging education and productive careers. A common incentive pro-
vision distributes funds when a beneficiary “graduates college.”95 Yet
such a condition may create more questions than it answers. Would this
include a trade school or a two-year community college? If not, is it the
settlor’s intent to disinherit an otherwise hardworking beneficiary?96
What about an online college program? What if the beneficiary had a
learning disability and graduating college was unattainable?
Another common provision incorporates income-matching incen-
tives,97 where every dollar earned by a beneficiary is matched by a dollar
from the trust. Does this penalize beneficiaries who want to take lower
paying jobs or complete mission work? What about a beneficiary that
chooses to stay home and take care of a family—does the settlor really
intend to leave that beneficiary nothing?
Good drafting can reduce the risk of unforeseen circumstances, but
it is unrealistic to expect attorneys to defend against all unforeseen cir-
cumstances. At a certain point, exceptions to incentive conditions create
more confusion and dilute the intended purpose of the trust.98 To draft
effective incentive trusts, attorneys are expected to perfectly mesh speci-
ficity with flexibility, two seemingly incompatible concepts. Drafting in-
centive trusts for settlors may leave attorneys exposed to litigation,99 and
even if the drafting attorney is not held liable, litigation is costly, which
is to the detriment of the beneficiaries.100
2. Prepare for Litigation
Trust and estate practice accounts for a large number of attorney
ethical violations.101 Many of the violations are related to attorneys tak-
ing advantage of elderly clients,102 but some violations are due to attor-
neys breaching a duty owed to beneficiaries.103 Traditionally, only
clients could hold attorneys liable for malpractice because privity of con-
94 See infra Part II.B.
95 Tate, supra note 68, at 453.
96 Lenok, supra note 76.
97 Tate, supra note 68, at 460.
98 Lenok, supra note 76.
99 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 8, at 418.
100 Id. at 19. “Wrangling among a decedent’s survivors over succession to the decedent’s
property entails potentially significant private and social costs . . . . The decedent’s property
may be consumed by litigation costs and relationships within the family may be irrevocably
damaged.”
101 See ABA, PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: 2012-1205 5 (2012).
102 See generally DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 8, at 263–324.
103 See Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583 (Ca. 1961).
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tract was required.104 Today, however, privity of contract is no longer a
malpractice requirement under Restatement § 51 of the Law Governing
Lawyers.105 The restatement specifically notes a few instances attorneys
must exhibit a duty of care to non-clients, including non-clients who an
attorney knows should benefit from their services.106 Beneficiaries to a
trust are non-clients who should benefit from attorney’s services, which
means beneficiaries can now sue their estate planning attorney for
malpractice.
The restatement offers the following guideline: attorneys may be
held liable to non-clients if they know “that a client intends as one of the
primary objectives of the representation that the lawyer’s services benefit
the non-client.”107 This is the exact zone in which estate planning attor-
neys operate. When drafting an estate plan, a primary objective of the
client is to benefit the beneficiaries.108 In fact, the first case that recog-
nized this provision of the restatement was a case involving an estate
plan. In Lucas v. Ham, the Supreme Court of California granted estate
beneficiaries standing to sue an attorney for malpractice because he made
a drafting error related to the rule against perpetuities.109 This opened the
door to future suits by similarly-situated beneficiaries.110 Although the
attorney was not held liable, his error was not harmless. The client in
Lucas was disserved because the litigation costs the estate money and cut
the beneficiaries’ inheritances.111 Incentive trusts bring problems112 for
attorneys, as they require consideration of unknown circumstances, lead-
ing to arbitrary results.
B. Public Policy Limitations
Any trust provision contrary to public policy can be ruled invalid by
the courts.113 When incentive provisions are declared invalid, the prop-
erty involved is distributed as though the conditions never existed, or as
if the conditions were satisfied.114 This public policy concern poses
104 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (Am. Law Inst. 2000).
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 8, at 418.
109 Lucas, 56 Cal. 2d 583 (Ca. 1961) (granting standing, but ultimately finding the attor-
ney was not liable for a drafting mistake involving the rule against perpetuities). The rule
against perpetuities prevents a property owner from exerting control over property for long
after the instrument was written, practically allowing donors to provide for all those in his
family whom he personally knew and the first generation after them. See also JESSE
DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY, 307–35 (8th ed. 2014).
110 See Lucas, 56 Cal. 2d 583 (1961).
111 See id.
112 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 8, at 305.
113 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 (Am. Law Inst. 2003).
114 Id.
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problems for both the settlors wishing to use incentive trusts and the
attorneys drafting them because public policy is a blurred and inconsis-
tent line; therefore, “simple and precise rules of validity or invalidity
frequently cannot be stated.”115 Valid provisions in one era may be unac-
ceptable in another.116 Settlors using trusts for estate planning cannot
reconcile an error because they are dead before the provisions are chal-
lenged. Unless backup provisions are drafted, property is passed by intes-
tacy, stripping settlors of their freedom of disposition.117 Even with
backup provisions, a challenge to the original provision devalues the
estate.
Due to the unpredictable nature of public policy, it is reckless to
draft testamentary trust provisions that hinge on a court’s interpretation
of valid public policy. “Various court interpretations and applications of
whether a condition violates public policy have led to conflict and confu-
sion.”118 For instance, “[a] trust condition or other provision in the terms
of a trust is ordinarily invalid if it tends to . . . discourage formation or
resumption of such a [familial] relationship.”119 In Shapira v. Union Na-
tional Bank, the court upheld a trust provision that limited potential
spouses to Jewish women.120 In Maddox v. Maddox, however, the court
struck down a provision that required a woman to marry within the
Quaker religion, finding the provision was an unreasonable restraint on
marriage.121 Why the discrepancy? The Shapira court distinguished its
case from Maddox, noting that although the provision restricted mar-
riage, it did not “unreasonably” restrict marriage.122 Whether a provision
115 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 (Am. Law Inst. 2003). See also DUKEMINIER
& SITKOFF, supra note 8, at 12. A Canadian man left a will instructing most of his estate be
given to the Toronto mother who gives birth to the most babies in the ten years following his
death. The Supreme Court of Canada upheld this provision as not against public policy and
“ten years later, four women, each of whom had given birth to nine children in those ten years,
received the equivalent of $2 million each as the winners. . .” Id. A Romanian man left his
property to his wife under the condition that she smoke five cigarettes a day for the rest of her
life. The wife plans to challenge the provision. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 29 (Am.
Law Inst. 2003).
116 Id. See also, Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that if
Bob Jones University wanted to keep their tax-exempt status they could no longer punish
interracial couples).
117 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 note c, cmt. (i)–(i)(2) (Am. Law Inst.,
2003).
118 See Shelly Steiner, Incentive Conditions: The Validity of Innovative Financial Parent-
ing by Passing Along Wealth and Values, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 897, 913 (2006).
119 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 (Am. Law Inst. 2003).
120 Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 832 (Ohio 1974).
121 See Maddox v. Maddox, 52 Va. 804 (Va. 1854).
122 Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 825. See also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 8, at 8
(suggesting that the unreasonable restraint in Maddox might be grounded on the fact that the
year was 1854, and the petitioner’s ability to relocate and find a qualifying spouse was not
reasonable in the “horse and buggy days.”). In 1974, Daniel Shapira had the benefit of air
travel, freeways, and telephone communication to find his Jewish spouse. Id.
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restricting marriage is valid depends on the court’s interpretation of “rea-
sonable” and “unreasonable.”123 Go figure.
Further, in Lewis v. Searles,124 a testamentary gift was conditioned
on the petitioner not remarrying, evidently discouraging the formation of
a familial relationship—an express violation of public policy.125 The
court decided, however, that the provision did not offend public policy
and noted that “[m]uch confusion has developed in attempts to determine
whether such a provision, in any given case, is a limitation or a condi-
tion.”126 The conflict and confusion surrounding the restraint of marriage
is only one segment of public policy, but this segment provides foresight
to conflict and confusion in other areas. Whether it be racial equality,
gender equality, medical and recreational use of banned substances, or
any other segment of public policy, there is not a reliable way for attor-
neys to predict what does not offend public policy today but will
tomorrow.
Recently, perhaps the most radical evolution in public policy has
occurred in the context of gay rights. Over a twenty-nine-year period
(1986-2015), the Supreme Court changed course from its opinion in
Bowers v. Hardwick to its opinions in Lawrence v. Texas and Obergefell
v. Hodges.127 Throughout this public policy evolution, how would an
incentive provision that requires a beneficiary to be heterosexual be
evaluated?
When Bowers was decided in 1986, engaging in homosexual activ-
ity was a punishable crime in twenty-four states and the District of Co-
lumbia.128 The issue the Court sought to determine was “whether the
Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to
engage in sodomy.”129 Representing the majority, Justice White wrote,
“[i]t is obvious to us that neither of these [formulas to determine if a right
is fundamentally protected by the Constitution] would extend a funda-
123 See Shapira, 315 N.E.2d; DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 8, at 8.
124 Lewis v. Searles, 452 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. 1970).
125 See id. at 154. The will stated: “I devise to my niece, Hattie L. Lewis, all of my real
and personal property of which I may die seized and possessed, so long as she remains single
and unmarried. In the event that the said Hattie L. Lewis shall marry, then and in this event, I
desire that all of my property, both real and personal be divided equally between my nieces
and nephews . . . .”
126 Id. at 155. The Court reconciled the discrepancy, finding that the condition was to
financially support the petitioner until she remarried, and the burden of support would then fall
on her spouse, rather than a condition restricting her from remarrying. Steiner, supra note 118,
at 917.
127 For a discussion, see infra note 128, 131, 134 and accompanying text. See Garrett
Epps, The U.S. Supreme Court Fulfills Its Promises on Same-Sex Marriage, THE ATL.: POLIT-
ICS & POLICY (June 26, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/same-sex-
marriage-supreme-court-obergefell/396995/.
128 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193–94 (1986).
129 See id. at 189.
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mental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy.”130
Thus, Bowers continued the policy that homosexuals had no right to en-
gage in sexual activity.
Based on similar facts, the Court overruled Bowers in Lawrence v.
Texas.131 The majority opinion was written by Justice Kennedy, who
wrote that, “[t]he petitioners are entitled to respect for their private
lives.”132 Thus, Lawrence rejected the policy accepted in Bowers, and
instead created the policy that homosexual activity would be tolerated, if
conducted in privacy.
The recognition of the right for same-sex people to engage in sexual
activity was preliminary to deciding if same-sex couples have a right to
marry—the judicial question of this millennium.133 In Obergefell v.
Hodges, the right to marry was conferred as a constitutional right.134 Jus-
tice Kennedy again wrote for the Court, “[b]ut while Lawrence con-
firmed a dimension of freedom that allows individuals to engage in
intimate association without criminal liability, it does not follow that
freedom stops there. Outlaw to outcast may be a step forward, but it does
not achieve the full promise of liberty.”135 Kennedy added, “[t]he ancient
origins of marriage confirm its centrality, but it has not stood in isolation
from developments in law and society. The history of marriage is one of
both continuity and change. That institution—even as confined to oppo-
site-sex relations—has evolved over time.”136 Thirty-years before the
Obergefell decision, it would have been hard to predict that the policy
would change so drastically and so quickly. But, as the Court observed,
even something as fundamental as marriage can “evolve[ ] over time.”137
The question relative to our inquiry—how would an incentive pro-
vision that requires a beneficiary to be heterosexual be evaluated—was
asked in In re Mandelbaum,138 but left unanswered.139 Mystery sur-
rounding this question adds to the conflict and confusion of drafting in-
centive trusts to align with public policy.140 Frank Mandelbaum amassed
a fortune as the founder of the ID-verification firm Intellicheck.141 Frank
130 Id. at 193–94.
131 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
132 Id.
133 See Epps, supra note 127.
134 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
135 Id. at 2600.
136 Id. at 2595.
137 See id.
138 See In re Mandelbaum, No. 2007-2181, 2013 WL 3929822, at *1 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. July
31, 2013).
139 See id.
140 See Steiner, supra note 118.
141 See Alyssa Newcomb, Gay Man Told to Marry Woman or Son Would Lose inheri-
tance, ABC NEWS: US (Aug. 20, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/gay-man-mary-woman-
son-lose-inheritance/story?id=17043550.
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left a will with a trust to provide money for any future grandchildren.142
Frank died in 2007, leaving behind a son Robert.143 A provision in the
trust indicated that a future biological child of Robert would only be
included if Robert married the child’s mother within six months of the
child’s birth.144 To complicate the matter, Robert was gay and his father
knew it.145 In 2011, Robert and his partner, John O’Donnell, became
parents to a son who was born via surrogate.146 The two married later in
2011 after gay marriage became legal in New York.147 Robert challenged
the trust provision on the basis that it was contrary to public policy.148
The parties did not litigate the case to its conclusion, but rather settled in
2013 on undisclosed terms.149
The above examples, and many others, demonstrate that the only
certain feature of public policy is that it is always changing. Creating a
valid testamentary plan for a client that hinges on evolving public policy
considerations, such as incentive trusts do, is a disservice to clients and
an unwise practice.
C. Unintended Consequences
Incentive trusts skew beneficiaries’ views of money.150 When
money becomes a child’s sole objective, there is a “risk of turning our
children into a kind of money junkie who has no true enthusiasms for
anything except more money.”151 Settlors must ask themselves, what
value systems are really being promoted by paying beneficiaries to have
certain goals and live a certain way?152 The unintended consequences of
incentive trusts are not well documented in estate planning literature,153
but can be observed in many circumstances. The most common out-
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 See id.
145 See id.
146 See id. (noting that neither of the men knew who Cooper’s biological father was).
147 N.Y. DOM. REL. Law § 10-a (McKinney 2011).
148 Newcomb, supra note 141.
149 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 8, at 13.
150 Eileen Gallo, Money and Soul: A Psychotherapist Looks at Incentive Trusts, J. OF FIN.
PLAN. (Dec. 2004), http://archive.li/3LsLF. Author Eileen Gallo is married to Jon Gallo, author
of supra note 6.
151 Id.
152 Zane, supra note 19.
153 For two reasons: first, trust documents are not public record; therefore, evidence of
unethical behavior is based primarily on what trustees and estate planners have seen and heard.
Second, most unethical behavior is based off social and moral principles and is not illegal,
requiring documentation.
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comes are: money cravings altering personalities154 and beneficiaries
cheating the trust to receive payments.155
1. The Hedonic Treadmill156
The pursuit of money is a never-ending game that has a mental ef-
fect on people.157 The maxim, “money changes people,” is used almost
exclusively to describe undesirable changes in a person’s attitude or be-
havior. When money is “our motivating factor, we can never get ahead of
our material wants.”158 Social psychologists call the pursuit of material
gain the hedonic treadmill.159 Incentive trusts invite beneficiaries to jump
on the hedonic treadmill, exposing them to values different from those
the trust settlor intended.160
Like him or not, President Donald Trump is a rich man. President
Trump was not the beneficiary of an incentive trust, but he was a benefi-
ciary of exceptional material resources.161 Such resources propelled his
career,162 but also subjected him to the risks of the hedonic treadmill.
Frederick Trump gave his son Donald a “small loan” to help start his real
estate career.163 The initial loan is said to be around one million dollars,
with subsequent loans and business connections that allowed the future
president to break into the New York City real estate market.164 By
leveraging his position to accumulate more wealth, and eventually be-
coming the only billionaire president in United States history,165 Presi-
dent Trump is a material success story. But, at what cost? Whether
President Trump’s quest for wealth forfeited principles of virtuous be-
havior is left to public debate. Might he be out for a jog on the hedonic
treadmill?166
Ultimately, incentive trusts make money a central concern in many
personal decisions.167 The Restatement (Third) of Trusts suggests that no
trust provisions should be valid if they “are unreasonably intrusive in
154 See Eileen Gallo, supra note 150.
155 See Gallo, supra note 6, ¶ 1102.4.
156 Eileen Gallo, supra note 150.
157 See id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 8, at 20.
162 See Donald Trump, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/profile/donald-trump/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 18, 2018).
163 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 8, at 20.
164 See id.
165 Trump, supra note 162.
166 Eileen Gallo, supra note 150.
167 See Shapira, 315 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio C.P. 1974); See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 29 cmt. Commentary on clause (c) (Am. Law Inst., 2003).
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significant personal decisions.”168 For example, in Shapira, Daniel Sha-
pira was concerned about how his inheritance was affecting his very per-
sonal decisions about if and whom he should marry.169 Most incentive
trust provisions invade one’s “significant personal decisions” and make
money the primary influence.170 The effects of the hedonic treadmill—
money motivating the decision-making process—contradict the reason
incentive trusts were created: to mold reckless beneficiaries into people
who could make their own responsible decisions.
2. Bait and Switch
Beneficiaries incentivized by money are also incentivized to cheat
the rules outlined in the trust. Estate planning attorneys tell stories of
beneficiaries presenting “altered copies of state and federal income tax
returns” and fake college transcripts that “reflect non-existent school en-
rollment,” to obtain trust disbursements.171 Others take advantage of am-
biguous language in the trust instrument, to obtain a benefit far from
what the settlor intended. A notorious example is the story of Tommy
Manville.172 Tommy’s grandfather, Charles B. Manville, was an Ameri-
can entrepreneur who died in 1927, leaving behind an estate worth $150
million (over $2 billion in today’s dollars).173 Charles’ financial legacy is
a product of keen business decisions and one bad—very bad—estate
planning oversight.
Charles began his career operating a photography studio in Neenah,
Wisconsin.174 In the mid-1870’s, he quit his job to search for gold during
the Black Hills gold rush.175 However, he failed to find a fortune and
returned to Wisconsin.176 In 1885, he founded his own building and sup-
ply company.177 Motivated by harsh Wisconsin winters, the Manville
Covering Company specialized in manufacturing a material to effectively
168 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 29 (2003); See Druker v. C.I.R., 697 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.
1982). Legislators drafting tax law determined that taxes should not influence the decision of
marrying. The history of tax law shows that congress saw using money to incentivize marriage
through the tax code as bad public policy. Why is it not the same for inheritance?
169 Shapira, 315 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio C.P. 1974).
170 Gallo, supra note 6, ¶ 1102.4.
171 Id.
172 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 8, at 10.
173 C.B. Manville, NEENAH HISTORICAL SOCIETY, (last visited JAN. 18, 2018), http://www
.neenahhistoricalsociety.com/c-b-manville/.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
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insulate heat bearing pipes.178 The secret ingredient was asbestos.179
Over the next fifteen years, business grew exponentially.180 Charles re-
tired and handed the family business to his three sons.181
Charles’ eldest son, Thomas F. Manville, was not fazed by his fa-
ther’s wealth and oversaw further growth of the family business.182 In
1901, Thomas artfully coordinated the consolidation of the business with
the Johns Manufacturing Company, thus creating Johns-Manville Incor-
porated.183 This move diversified the company and expanded its offer-
ings to the construction, aerospace, and automotive industries, among
others.184
Thomas F. Manville had two children of his own, a son, Tommy Jr.,
and a daughter, Lorraine.185 In his life, Tommy Jr. became a notorious
national celebrity, similar to that of a Kardashian. It was a guilty pleasure
of national pop culture to stay tuned to what Tommy Manville was do-
ing, and Tommy kept everyone entertained.186
Tommy was a rambunctious child who ran away from home when
he was thirteen and was always involved in mischief.187 According to
reports, Tommy’s grandfather Charles saw the warning signs and devised
a trust for Tommy that incentivized him to settle down.188 The terms of
the trust stipulated that Tommy was to be paid between $250,000 and
178 Id.; See Trainer v. Manville, No. 427, 138, 147–50 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal docketed,
(1st Dep’t May 23, 1929), https://books.google.com/books?id=m9xIeiHV5noC&printsec=
frontcover#v=onepage&q=Manville&f=false.
179 Matt Mauney, Johns Manville History, https://www.asbestos.com/companies/johns-
manville.php.
180 Trainer, No. 427, at 147.
181 Id. at 148.
182 Id. at 149.
183 Id. at 148.
184 Company History, JOHNS-MANVILLE, https://www.jm.com/en/our-company/history-
heritage-berkshire-hathaway/company-history (last visited Jan. 18, 2015). There were lawsuits
filed against Johns-Manville for asbestos related deaths as early as 1929. Asbestosis is a
nonmalignant scarring of the lungs caused solely by exposure to asbestos. Johns-Manville
divested itself of its interests in all asbestos-related businesses and created the Johns-Manville
Personal Injury Trust to settle claims brought by asbestos workers throughout the late 1900’s
and early 2000’s. Johns-Manville significantly restructured in the 1990’s and was acquired by
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. in 2001.
185 See Madelaine Wilson, What Became of Tommy Manville? Must Wait 6 Years for Wife
11, NORTH WEST CHESTER TIMES, NEW CASTLE TRIBUNE, Oct. 8, 1959, at 19.
186 See generally ANITA MANVILLE, THE LIVES AND WIVES OF TOMMY MANVILLE (1972).
Anita was the sixth wife of Tommy Manville and wrote this book about her experience.
“Tommy Manville was a Manhattan socialite and heir to the Johns-Manville asbestos fortune.
He was a celebrity in the mid 20th Century [sic], by virtue of his large financial inheritance,
and his 13 marriages to 11 women. This feat won him an entry in the Guinness Book of World
Records and made him the subject of much gossip.”
187 See Wilson, supra note 185.
188 See Zane, supra note 19.
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$1,000,000 when he married.189 Charles saw marriage as an event that
would encourage Tommy’s maturity, but it also coincided with his own
moral principles.190
Financial interests motivated Tommy to eventually marry thirteen
times.191 Due to ambiguous language in the trust instrument, Tommy
was paid each time he was married, not just the first time.192 Tommy
paid the women a portion of his trust disbursement, pocketed the rest,
and then, “when he needed more money, he’d get married again.”193 At
age sixty-five, Tommy reminisced about his passion for auto mechanics,
discerning that it was the career he would have chosen without the
“handicap of inherited millions.”194 During a 1959 newspaper interview,
Tommy calculated he could not “afford any more alimony for six years”
and was feeling “a little bit lonely.”195 Do you think Grandpa Charles
would have been proud?
Many incentive trusts are drafted with good intentions.196 However,
dangling money in front of reckless beneficiaries is unlikely to signifi-
cantly change their worldview.197 More often, the beneficiaries will ei-
ther find themselves on the hedonic treadmill or manipulate the trust to
receive their payments, or both.198
D. Motivation
Incentive trusts misidentify how money affects behavior.199 Money
is not an effective incentive if the behavior being incentivized involves
cognitive skills such as judgement and reasoning.200 The cognitive skills
coveted by incentive trusts are best achieved when motivation is intrin-
sic, not extrinsic.201 Therefore, settlors should seek to inspire benefi-
ciaries from within, rather than reward them for completing tasks. When
beneficiaries are forced to avoid doing something they want to do, they
189 See id.; see also David Krumboltz, Me and My Car: ‘54 Rolls Convertible’s First
Owner had a Unique Career, MERCURY NEWS, July 17, 2016. Trust accounts are not public
record, which explains the uncertainty of the exact terms of the trust Charles B. Manville
created for his grandson Tommy.
190 See Krumboltz, supra note 189.
191 See id.
192 See Zane, supra note 19.
193 Id.
194 Wilson, supra note 185. On top of the trust fund Tommy received from his grandfa-
ther, Tommy also inherited 10 million dollars from his father, Tommy F. Manville Sr., in 1925
following Tommy Sr.’s death.
195 Id.
196 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 8, at 9.
197 See infra Part III.D.
198 See supra Part III.C.
199 See Gallo, supra note 6, ¶ 1102.1.
200 See id.
201 See id.
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will likely “overvalue the action that was unfairly restricted,” and rebel
against their deceased parents’ wishes.202
Of the main types of incentive provisions,203–obtaining a certain
level of education, developing a particular moral framework, engaging in
a productive career, and restraining destructive behaviors—all are “cog-
nitively complex, self-motivated, and intrinsic to the individual.”204
Human psychology and sociology suggest that attempts to incentivize
cognitively-complex, intrinsically-driven behaviors are counter-produc-
tive and are more likely to produce a child with poor self-motivation,
self-confidence, and life skills.205 This is an undesirable result because
clients interested in incentive trusts “are almost exclusively parents who
complain about their children’s lack of self-motivation and self-
efficacy.”206
A main purpose of incentive trusts is to develop self-efficacy in
beneficiaries.207 Self-efficacy is “the belief in one’s ability to succeed in
life,” overcome challenges, and maintain a strong commitment to
goals.208 “Mastery experiences,” are the most effective ways to develop
self-efficacy.209 Mastery experiences are defined as opportunities to suc-
ceed; such opportunities should start small, giving the subject an “oppor-
tunity to build on each successive success.”210 People who are convinced
that they can be successful are more likely to “persevere in the face of
adversity and quickly rebound from setbacks.”211 People who have de-
veloped a high degree of self-efficacy demonstrate what social psycholo-
gists call autotelic behavior. Autotelic behavior is a state of mind that
makes the main goal of any activity the experience itself.212 For example,
a beneficiary demonstrating autotelic traits would graduate college for
the importance of education and the maturation experience, not because
he or she would receive a reward for doing so.213 That is to say, “auto-
telic behavior is behavior we engage in because we enjoy it.”214 Unfortu-
202 Tate, supra note 68, at 490.
203 See supra Part II.B.
204 Gallo, supra note 6, ¶ 1102.1.
205 See id.
206 Gallo, supra note 6, ¶ 1102.3.
207 See id.
208 Id.
209 Albert Bandura, Self-efficacy, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN BEHAV. 1, 71–81 (V.S.
Ramachaudran ed., New York Academic Press 1994), reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MENTAL
HEALTH (H. Friedman ed., 1998).
210 Id.; Gallo, supra note 6, ¶ 1102.3.
211 Gallo, supra note 6, ¶ 1102.3.
212 See id.
213 See id.
214 Id.
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nately, research shows that using external motivators, like money in an
incentive trust, does not develop self-efficacy and autotelic behavior.215
Over a hundred studies since 1970 have revealed that monetary in-
centives decrease personal growth and self-motivated behaviors sought
by settlors.216 The principle derived from these studies is known as the
Tom Sawyer effect. “Paying someone to do what they initially viewed as
intrinsically interesting turns the activity into ‘work’ that is less interest-
ing.”217 One of these studies sought to determine the effect of external
rewards on intrinsic motivation.218 The experiment gave groups of stu-
dents cash rewards to complete projects in an allotted amount of time;
then, researchers tracked if the students would use designated break
times to work on their projects.219 Students who were paid substantially
reduced the time they spent working on the project during their breaks
compared to the control group of students who were never paid.220 Based
on the results, the researchers concluded that when money is used as an
extrinsic motivator, subjects lose intrinsic motivation to complete activi-
ties because the activity becomes work, rather than an interest.221 “Al-
though rewards can control people’s behavior—indeed, that is why they
are so widely advocated—the primary negative effect of rewards is that
they tend to forestall self-regulation, as demonstrated by this experi-
ment.”222 Thus, the development of self-efficacy is inhibited.
One might ask, are incentive trusts not a reflection of real life,
where pay for performance is commonplace. The previous experiment
shows that reward structures can motivate workers to complete routine
tasks by commissioning workers to habitually participate for a cash re-
ward; but, cash rewards will not challenge workers to engage in their
work and work harder.223 This payment model is useful in settings that
care more about completing objectives than inspiring their participants.
Money can help accomplish tasks, but it will not transform peoples’ im-
pressions of why they are working and their attitudes towards the
215 See id.
216 See id. ¶ 1102.2.
217 Id.
218 See Edward Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 18
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 105, 108–09 (1971) (analyzing 128 studies in which the
“Tom Sawyer” effect was replicated time and time again in carefully-controlled experiments).
Gallo, supra note 6, ¶ 1102.2.
219 See Deci, supra note 218, at 108–09.
220 See id. at 109–12.
221 See id. at 114.
222 Edward Deci, A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Ex-
trinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 627, 659 (1999). Deci and two
colleagues published an analysis of 128 studies where the “Tom Sawyer” effect was replicated
time and time again in carefully controlled experiments. Gallo, supra note 6, ¶ 1102.2.
223 See Deci, supra note 218.
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work.224 People who lack intrinsic motivation but are commissioned to
complete tasks for money will simply complete the task for their money
and be done, not experiencing any available collateral benefits. For ex-
ample, if a beneficiary is “paid to graduate from college, the beneficiary
may finish school but lose lifelong intellectual curiosity.”225
This concept is validated in another experiment that sought to ex-
plain why there are fewer cabs available on a rainy afternoon in Manhat-
tan.226 The study found that most cab drivers set a daily monetary goal
and go home once they meet that goal.227 Because more people want
rides when it rains, cab drivers meet their goals earlier in the day and go
home. Although they could earn more money by continuing to work,
their intrinsic drive is depressed once they reach their monetary goal,
thus restricting their ability to take advantage of the benefits a rainy day
provides.228
Like the students completing projects and the Manhattan cab driv-
ers, beneficiaries to incentive trusts risk having their intrinsic motivation
stripped and self-efficacy blocked. Deprived of intrinsic motivation and
self-efficacy, beneficiaries will either monotonously collect their rewards
with no desire to benefit from the activities, or not participate in the
incentive scheme at all.229 Using money to motivate creates external mo-
tivation rather than relying on personal enthusiasm or passion.230 There-
fore, if settlors’ goals are to inspire beneficiaries’ self-motivation and
moral framework, incentive trusts will not have such an effect. Incentive
trusts that condition disbursements on achieving certain tasks might pro-
voke beneficiaries to monotonously complete the tasks; however, incen-
tive trusts will not stimulate behaviors that the settlors intended— thus
subjecting beneficiaries to the hedonic treadmill,231 tempting them to be
unethical,232 and undercutting the purpose of the incentive trust with un-
intended consequences.
III. WHAT WOULD YOU DO WITH MILLIONS OF DOLLARS?
Incentive trusts originated in estate planning to solve a legitimate
dilemma.233 On the one hand, wealthy people want to leave a meaningful
224 See id. at 105.
225 Tate, supra note 68, at 490.
226 See Colin Camerer et al., Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a
Time, 112 THE Q. J. ECON., 341, 408 (1997).
227 See id. at 416.
228 See id.
229 See Gallo, supra note 6, ¶ 1102.2.
230 See id. ¶ 1102.3; Eileen Gallo, supra note 150.
231 See supra Part II.C.1.
232 See supra Part II.C.2.
233 See supra Introduction.
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legacy; on the other hand, they want to protect their descendants from
becoming “wastrels or wantons.”234 In theory, incentive trusts are a
mechanism for addressing both concerns, but as noted above, they inef-
fectively alleviate the concerns they were designed to mitigate.235 Re-
sponsible attorneys should be honest with their clients about the futility
of incentive trusts to avoid the false reassurances that incentive trusts
provide.236
Quashing incentive trusts does not mean that a parent’s final di-
lemma is unsolvable; it means that it is time for a new solution. A new
solution should build on the shortcomings of incentive trusts and incor-
porate new principles to effectively carry out the settlor’s intent. To ex-
tract such principles, one need only look to past success stories offered
by some of America’s wealthiest people. Through their stories, effective
tactics have emerged to help donors leave positive legacies, teach benefi-
ciaries to be responsible, and motivate beneficiaries to carve their own
paths:237 first, worry most about parenting—not leaving an inheritance;
second, give inheritances to beneficiaries later in life rather than earlier;
third, be open in discussing family expectations; finally, incorporate
charitable giving into estate planning.238
First, child rearing should come before estate planning.239 If benefi-
ciaries possess self-efficacy and a “can do attitude,” the purpose of con-
ditional bequests become unnecessary.240 Roy Grinker Jr., a
psychoanalyst who spends his career working with children of the
wealthy, said, “Rather than give rich parents money advice, I would give
them child-rearing advice.”241 He finds, far too often, that parents pay
little attention to their children’s upbringing and are more concerned
about developing a strategic estate plan.242 “It is not the money that de-
stroys our children, but the parents who earn the money but neglect to
instill values in their offspring.”243 A proper upbringing is the “ultimate
safeguard” against beneficiaries being irresponsible with their inheri-
tance.244 If children are taught the right principles then their parents need
not be concerned with how an inheritance will negatively affect their
offspring.
234 Kirkland, supra note 4.
235 See supra Part II.
236 See generally Part I, II.
237 See generally Kirkland, supra note 4.
238 See id.
239 See id.
240 See Gallo, supra note 6, ¶ 1102.3.
241 Kirkland, supra note 4.
242 See id.
243 Gallo, supra note 6, ¶ 1100 (citing Gallo, J. & Gallo, E., Estate Planning for the
Postponed Generation, 3 PROB. & PROP. 6, 8–9 (1989)).
244 Kirkland, supra note 4.
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There are multiple ways to instill these values in potential benefi-
ciaries.245 H. Ross Perot became a billionaire after selling his electronic
data system company to General Motors.246 He said, “If your kids grow
up living in fairyland thinking that they’re princes and princesses, you’re
going to curse their lives.”247 Some parents opt for a subtler approach.
Warren Buffet added, “Love is the greatest advantage a parent can
give.”248 Eugene Lang, who made his fortune as a tech developer, paid
for his children’s education, gave them a nominal sum, and since then
has “given them nothing but encouragement.”249 Lang defended his tech-
nique by saying, “I want to give my kids the tremendous satisfaction of
making it on their own.”250 As adults, Lang’s children have become a
lawyer, an actor, and an investment analyst.251 The bottom line is that
teaching productive behaviors has to be done during the parents’ life-
times. When parents are ineffective at teaching these behaviors while
they are alive, it is unlikely that such behavior can be taught by an estate
plan.252
Second, it is better to give inheritances to beneficiaries later in life,
rather than earlier. John Train, a Harvard graduate, decorated financial
advisor, and author, warns that windfalls handed to children who have
yet to accomplish anything will “inevitably tend to corrupt them.”253
Most estate advisors have agreed that twenty-one is “too early for most
children to reap a windfall.”254 Giving a significant inheritance to young
beneficiaries is more likely to thwart development than if a donor waits
until the beneficiary has already matured.255 Beneficiaries who receive
inheritances later in life are more likely to be responsible and benefit
from the sense of accomplishment for what they achieved prior to receiv-
ing an inheritance.256
Third, it is important to let beneficiaries know where they stand.257
Keeping family expectations secret and surprising beneficiaries with con-
ditioned inheritances is one of the main warnings that foreshadow litiga-
tion.258 John Train recommends that “talks about money, like those about
245 See generally id.
246 See id.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Kirkland, supra note 4.
250 Id.
251 See id.
252 See id.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 See supra Part II.C.2.
256 See id.
257 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 8, at 305.
258 See id.
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sex, begin as early as possible.”259 This way, beneficiaries are not left in
the dark and are more likely to be on-board with the overall plan.260
Parents might intend to motivate children through a testamentary scheme
that leaves a small or conditional inheritance, but many children view it
as a personal rejection when a parent “disinherits, disfavors, or discour-
ages a child.”261 In Nelson v. Daniels,262 a disinherited son contested his
mother’s will saying, “You’re not going to make me believe that my
mother hated me the day she died.”263 Invoking bitterness in benefi-
ciaries can lead to further rebellion264—contradicting the purpose of the
testamentary scheme.
Finally, charitable giving can be a better option than passing inheri-
tances to descendants.265 Investment guru, Warren Buffet said that the
“perfect legacy” for one’s children is “enough money so they would feel
they can do anything, but not so much that they could do nothing.”266
Instead of planning to leave his full fortune to his children, Buffet
pledged $31 billion dollars to the Gates Foundation in 2006.267 Buffet
explained that he wants his kids to “carve out their own place” in the
world, and the best way to do that might be through donating his fortune
to charitable foundations.268
Many wealthy people choose to start their own charitable founda-
tions.269 Then, they allow their descendants to take active roles in the
foundation to learn responsibility and attain gratification. Eugene Lang,
who died April 8, 2017, did not plan to pass on any wealth to his children
through his estate.270 Instead, he made his children trustees of his private
foundation.271 Lang cheerfully explained, “In a way they’re spending
their inheritance with me . . . and getting a lot of satisfaction and joy
from it.”272 Planning for “lifetime participation in the mission and goal
of the family through judicious use of family partnerships, charitable
259 Kirkland, supra note 4.
260 See generally id.
261 Gallo, supra note 6, ¶ 1100.
262 See No. 94CA29, 1995 WL 535200 at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1995).
263 Id.
264 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 8, at 306 (citing McCullen, Keeping Peace in
the Family While You are Resting in Peace: Making Sense of and Presenting Will Contests, 8
MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR, 87 (2006)).
265 See id.
266 Kirkland, supra note 4.
267 See Robert Smith, Buffett Gift Sends $31 Billion to Gates Foundation, NPR, Washing-
ton D.C. 26 June 2006, available at https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=55
12893.
268 Kirkland, supra note 4.
269 See Burger, supra note 59 and accompanying text.
270 See Kirkland, supra note 4.
271 See id.
272 Id.
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lead trusts, and foundations can alleviate the need for stringent restric-
tions on behavior later.”273
IV. THE ANSWER: HBT
Until now, a parent’s final dilemma was unsolved. Hereafter, incen-
tive trusts should be thought of as provisional treatments, only acceptable
for beneficiaries who need a slight nudge. “Most of the time and for most
people, incentive trusts do not produce” desired results.274 A new solu-
tion should cure the shortcomings of incentive trusts and incorporate the
lessons learned from wealthy authorities. The solution shall be called
Hidden Bonus Trusts (HBTs) which will be useful estate planning tools
for settlors, beneficiaries, and drafting attorneys.
A. Structure and Drafting
HBTs are an improved alternative and a new suggestion. Built on
the four identified shortcomings of incentive trusts and incorporating
successful methods already used by America’s most wealthy, HBTs are
testamentary tools designed to leave proud legacies, motivate reckless
beneficiaries, and remain legally effective in lieu of changing circum-
stances. The theory behind HBTs is to make beneficiaries decide for
themselves what behaviors uphold the settlor’s expectations. The choice
is induced by communicating the general HBT arrangement to benefi-
ciaries but keeping the specific provisions hidden.275 Letting benefi-
ciaries make life choices without cash dangling in their faces avoids
public policy restrictions, stimulates intrinsic motivation, and develops
what settlors covet: self-efficacy.276 There is a five step framework to
creating HBTs: first, select the parties; second, make the purpose state-
ment; third, have a meeting of the fiduciaries; fourth, define the bonus
structure; fifth, choose a charitable backup.
Step one: select the parties. Each HBT needs a settlor, attorney, trus-
tee, beneficiary, and trust director. It is suitable and sometimes preferable
that one individual holds multiple positions. The settlor gives away prop-
erty by means of a trust and hopes to influence the behavior of the bene-
273 Whiting, supra note 69, at 12.
274 Gallo et al., Not Your Typical Incentive Trust: The ROTE and FST, Part I, J. FIN.
PLAN. (2011), https://www.onefpa.org/journal/Pages/Not%20Your%20Typical%20Incentive%
20Trust%20The%20ROTE%20and%20FST%20Part%201.aspx.
275 See Unif. Trust Code § 105(b)(8)–(9) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). The Uniform Trust
Code (UTC) originally allowed preventing “a beneficiary from learning of a trust’s existence,
but only until the beneficiary reached age 25.” Many states that enacted the UTC did not
accept this provision; instead, states permitted that a beneficiary could be kept uninformed
until a later age or, indefinitely—if there is a third party who has standing to bring suit against
the trustee for breach of trust. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 8, at 681.
276 Supra Part III.
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ficiaries. The attorney advises the settlor, drafts the trust document, and
oversees the lawful administration of the trust. The trustee maintains the
trust property, manages investments, communicates with beneficiaries
and distributes trust property when beneficiaries’ behaviors align with
the settlor’s expectations. It is important to carefully select a trustee who
is dedicated to the beneficiaries’ well-being and who understands the set-
tlor’s values277 because the trustee determines whether the beneficiaries
qualify for trust disbursements. The beneficiaries collect trust property in
accordance with the trust instrument. The trust director is the only posi-
tion not used in all other trusts and is vital to HBTs. The director has
standing to sue the trustee for breach of duty on behalf of the benefi-
ciaries because HBT beneficiaries do not know the details of the trust.278
Examples of a trustee breaching fiduciary duties include not administer-
ing trust property when a beneficiary qualifies and breaking confidential-
ity. The trust director must be familiar with, and proficient at, evaluating
the administration of the trust; the drafting attorney is a good option to
fill this role.
Step two: make the purpose statement. Once the parties are desig-
nated, the settlor must create the purpose statement which explains the
settlor’s expectations and the bonus structure. The purpose statement is
drafted by the settlor and the attorney and then explained, clarified, and
justified to the beneficiaries, trustee, and trust director (“interested par-
ties”). Purpose statements should assert the settlor’s expectations for ben-
eficiaries and explain that the settlor created a hidden bonus structure to
emphasize such expectations. It is paramount that the settlor is candid
with the interested parties and fully embodies the spirit of the testamen-
tary scheme. The settlor’s expectations can incorporate education, career,
and morality, similar to incentive trusts;279 but, the expectations do not
include specific benchmarks. Rather, HBTs make beneficiaries decide
for themselves what behaviors align with the settlor’s expectations, using
the purpose statement for guidance.
Step three: a meeting of the fiduciaries. After the beneficiaries un-
derstand the HBT concept, the settlor, attorney, trustee, and trust director
should formulate the finer details. The fiduciary meeting is led by the
attorney and focuses on ensuring that the settlor, trustee, and trust direc-
tor are on the same page. HBTs operate as discretionary trusts to pre-
277 A family member is more likely to take an interest in the well-being of the benefi-
ciaries. Beneficiaries could include immediate family members, such as mothers and fathers,
but also extended family, such as aunts, uncles, or grandparents—even a mature sibling of the
beneficiaries involved in the bonus trust could be a dependable trustee.
278 For context, see Dukeminier, supra note 275 on third party standing and accompany-
ing text.
279 See supra Part II.B.
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serve flexibility over time.280 This gives the trustee power to “determine
when, to whom, and what amount to make distributions,”281 in accor-
dance with the purpose statement and finer details outlined at the fiduci-
ary meeting. The trustee is not bound by strict enforcement requirements.
For example, if a trust expectation is for a beneficiary to become finan-
cially independent, the trustee might pay a bonus when a beneficiary
creates an income savings plan, or begins weekly meal preparation rather
than eating out, or any other activity that the trustee determines to rein-
force the trust’s expectations. HBT trustees are highly involved; there-
fore, settlors must choose them wisely. It is also important that the trust
director, as the enforcer, grasps how to properly administer the trust.
Most often there are not specific benchmarks that indicate when bonuses
should be paid, which differs from incentive trusts. The HBT concept is
that the trustee, trust director, and attorney understand how the settlor
would approach the circumstances and act accordingly.
At the fiduciary meeting the settlor retains the ability to give more
detailed direction to the trustee and trust director. Here, the settlor can
outline specific circumstances, beyond the trustee’s discretion, where the
beneficiaries get bonuses. For example, the settlor could stipulate that the
beneficiaries should receive bonuses each time they get a promotion,
have a child, earn a secondary degree, attend Easter church service, etc.
The enumerated criteria are not made known to the beneficiaries. There-
fore, if a beneficiary gets promoted at work, she will experience the joy,
sense of achievement, and self-satisfaction to the full extent because she
decided on her own to accomplish this goal, rather than having her goals
outlined beforehand by monetary incentives.
Step four: define the bonus structure. The bonus structure should be
finalized at the fiduciary meeting. The bonus structure is gradual. Each
beneficiary is entitled to a certain share of the trust, decided by the set-
tlor. Each share is pooled together to form the trust principal; however,
the trustee administers bonuses to each beneficiary from their allotted
share. Each allotted share is divided into as many phases as the settlor
stipulates. A phase is a period of time that the beneficiary has to collect
bonuses. Each phase is designated a bonus amount available to the bene-
ficiary for that phase. Residual bonuses are subject to the charitable giv-
ing provision. The trustee should distribute smaller bonuses for
preliminary habit-forming behaviors (meal prepping, supra) and larger
bonuses for milestone achievements aligned with the purpose statement
(becoming financially independent, supra). This bonus system utilizes
280 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 8, at 696.
281 Id.
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“mastery experiences,”282 which allow beneficiaries to savor their
achievement and build on each success.
Step five: choose a charitable back up. Each HBT should be backed
up and accompanied by a charitable giving provision. The charitable giv-
ing provision serves two main purposes. First, it protects the settlor’s
legacy if beneficiaries choose not to meet the expectations discussed in
the purpose statement. Residual bonuses not paid to beneficiaries will be
paid to the charitable organizations the settlor selects. This way, the set-
tlor’s fortune is still administered to a cause the settlor deemed worthy.
This also forms a built-in opportunity to include beneficiaries in charita-
ble giving. The trustee makes residual bonus donations in the names of
the settlor and beneficiary.283 Second, the charitable provision serves as a
no contest clause. If a beneficiary challenges the HBT in court, the trus-
tee is directed to immediately pay any share designated for the challeng-
ing beneficiary to the enumerated charities.
B. HBTs in Action
The subtle difference between HBTs and incentive trusts solves a
parent’s final dilemma. HBTs allow parents to leave meaningful legacies
and protect their descendants from becoming “wastrels or wantons.”284
HBTs build on the four identified shortcomings of incentive trusts:285 (1)
inflexibility, (2) public policy, (3) unintended consequences, and (4) mo-
tivation; HBTs also incorporate the successful methods already used by
America’s most wealthy:286 (5) parenting first, (6) giving later rather
than sooner, (7) discussing family expectations, and (8) charitable giving.
1. Flexibility
HBTs avoid pinning specificity against flexibility.287 The “hidden”
arrangement in HBTs produces a testamentary tool that encompasses
both specificity and flexibility. The settlor is specific with his expecta-
tions and outlines them in the purpose statement. Then, beneficiaries are
given autonomy to live in a way they believe meets the settlor’s expecta-
tions, and the trustee administers bonuses when beneficiaries engage in
conduct that the settlor would celebrate. This flexible system is authenti-
282 Supra Part III.D.
283 Tax implications need to be determined separately; however, beneficiaries likely will
not qualify for a charitable tax deduction under I.R.C. § 172 because they will never exercise
dominion over unclaimed portions of the trust. See Haverly v. United States, 513 F.2d 224,
226–27. (7th Cir. 1975).
284 Kirkland, supra note 4.
285 Supra Part II.
286 Supra Part IV.
287 Supra Part II.A.
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cated by the trust director and safeguarded from litigation by the charita-
ble no contest clause.
For example, in the purpose statement, a settlor might discuss the
importance of continuing education. The settlor could further instruct the
trustee during the fiduciary meeting to give a bonus to any beneficiary
who graduates from college. The trustee must give bonuses to benefi-
ciaries who graduate from college, but the trustee still has discretion to
give bonuses to beneficiaries who continue their education in other ways.
Continuing education is not limited to a college degree, but rather could
encompass trade school, online accounting course, pleasure reading, etc.
2. Public Policy
The “hidden” aspect of HBTs also make them durable amidst
changing public policy. Incentive trusts are susceptible to void on public
policy grounds because they pay beneficiaries to act towards announced
benchmarks.288 HBTs do not require beneficiaries to act any specific
way, only in concert with the settlor’s expectations. Therefore, there is
no concrete position that could be voided on public policy grounds. This
arrangement eliminates the risk that a settlor’s testamentary scheme will
be disrupted based on evolving public policy.
For example, imagine an incentive trust provision that payed benefi-
ciaries to continue a family dog kennel business. In five years, a shift in
public policy determines that housing dogs without access to a wading
pool constitutes animal cruelty. If beneficiaries do not wish to make ac-
commodations to continue the family kennel, they can sue to invalidate
the trust on the grounds it violates public policy. If the settlor used an
HBT to encourage beneficiaries to continue the family business and the
same policy change happened, the trust could not be voided because it
would not explicitly state that the beneficiaries must run a dog kennel to
qualify for payments. Rather, the “hidden” part of the HBT might direct
the trustee to pay the beneficiaries if they remain in the kennel business,
but the settlor’s purpose statement would allow more general fulfilment
such as an active role in dog services.
3. Unintended Consequences
HBTs do not dangle dollar signs in front of beneficiaries, but rather,
focus on resulting behavior. The problem with the hedonic treadmill289 is
that once beneficiaries reach a monetary incentive, it is unsatisfying.
Beneficiaries find their satisfaction can only be quenched by achieving
more milestones and earning more money. Beneficiaries to HBTs are not
288 See supra Part II.B.
289 See supra Part II.C.1.
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aware of monetary rewards for any specific behavior. In this way, benefi-
ciaries’ choices are based on an intrinsic motivation rather than an extrin-
sic motivation. Change induced by intrinsic motivation endures.
One concern raised by HBTs is what if the hidden bonuses consume
the beneficiaries. Any conditional bequest is meant for beneficiaries who
lack “self-motivation and self-efficacy.”290 Therefore, if an HBT does
not motivate beneficiaries to try and meet the expectations outlined in the
purpose statement, beneficiaries are in no worse position than before the
trust was created. Beneficiaries can either keep trying to figure out the
bonus provisions by behaving how they believe the settlor would want
(which is the purpose of the HBT to begin with), or the share of the trust
available to the unparticipating beneficiaries will be donated to charity.
4. Motivation
HBTs build self-efficacy and encourage autotelic behavior by draw-
ing on the beneficiaries’ intrinsic motivation.291 Incentive trusts give
beneficiaries a “to-do list,” while HBTs seek to inspire beneficiaries
from within. HBTs empower beneficiaries to determine on their own
which behaviors best carry out the guidelines set forth in the purpose
statement; therefore, HBTs are more likely to stimulate lasting change.
Allowing beneficiaries to choose their actions creates the cognitive step-
ping stones towards “mastery experiences.”292 When beneficiaries, rather
than the settlors, are choosing their behaviors, the behaviors will likely
become autotelic.293
For example, compare an HBT expectation of living a healthy lifes-
tyle against an incentive trust benchmark of “quit smoking for cash.” A
beneficiary to the HBT will have to decide what promotes health, which
rudimentarily would involve not smoking. The process of internalizing
this decision and acting upon it promotes self-efficacy. The same benefi-
ciary facing the incentive trust provision is primarily externally moti-
vated, which in most cases is not enough to break the habit or addiction.
5. Parenting First
The purpose statement of a HBT serves as a pseudo parenting ses-
sion. It allows settlors to explain to beneficiaries the reasons behind the
HBT and why the expectations are valuable and reasonable. This goes a
long way to ensure beneficiaries do not feel slighted, but rather feel cared
for.
290 Gallo, supra note 6, ¶ 1102.3.
291 See supra Part II.D.
292 Id.
293 Id.
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For example, when settlors deliver the purpose statement, they will
confront the beneficiaries. This meeting allows settlors to engage in a
teaching moment and explain the reasoning behind the HBT to the bene-
ficiaries, rather than leaving the teaching moments for the trust document
alone. In all circumstances, it will be better if the beneficiaries have been
taught these values throughout their lives.
6. Later Rather Than Sooner
Beneficiaries are more likely to be mature enough to handle an in-
heritance when they are older.294 HBTs pay bonuses when it is apparent
to the trustee that beneficiaries are making decisions in line with the pur-
pose statement. Therefore, HBT beneficiaries receive bonuses when they
demonstrate older levels of maturity, not older age. This differentiates
HBTs from incentive trusts. The external motivation that incentive trusts
rely on will not develop the skills beneficiaries need to handle significant
inheritances.
For example, incentive trusts designed to pay beneficiaries when
they attain levels of financial security commonly disburse payments
based on the beneficiaries’ tax returns.295 Rather than focusing solely on
the end result, HBTs distribute bonuses to encourage steps towards that
end result: buying life insurance, disability insurance, opening an IRA or
contributing to a 401K. By using HBTs, settlors will know that benefi-
ciaries reached the desired maturity before receiving their inheritances.
7. Discuss Family Expectations
If settlors have not previously discussed family expectations with
their beneficiaries, the purpose statement provides the platform to do so.
As discussed above, being clear with expectations and reasons for using
a conditional estate planning tool helps to ensure beneficiaries do not feel
slighted, but cared for.
For example, an incentive trust provision that provides a trust pay-
ment only after a beneficiary graduates from an Ivy League law school
could lead that beneficiary to feel undeserving and deficient to the set-
tlor. In HBTs, the settlor explains the reasons for his expectations in the
purpose statement, which are more likely because of the experience the
settlor had at such an institution, not as a metric to define the benefici-
ary’s self-worth. To avoid the situation seen in Nelson,296 where a bene-
ficiary believed his mother hated him when she died, HBTs empower
settlors to explain the reasons behind the testamentary plan they chose.
294 See supra Part III.
295 See Gallo, supra note 6, ¶ 1105.2.
296 See Nelson v. Daniels, No. 94CA29, 1995 WL 535200, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 5,
1995).
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8. Charitable Giving
Charitable giving is a core element of HBTs.297 Charitable giving
protects the trust’s assets and ensures that if the beneficiaries do not meet
the settlor’s expectations, the settlor’s fortune still goes to an admirable
cause. Charitable giving is also a tool used to give beneficiaries a sense
of achievement, responsibility, and self-satisfaction that fulfills civic
opportunities.
For example, if an HBT provides a ten-year phase that a beneficiary
is eligible to receive $100,000 of bonuses and the beneficiary collects
$53,000 of the eligible bonuses, the remaining $47,000 will be donated
to the charity the settlor designated. Also, if unhappy beneficiaries sue
the settlor’s estate claiming misconduct, the trustee is instructed to pay
the beneficiaries’ whole share to the designated charity. These backup
charitable giving provisions ensure that the settlor’s legacy will be
protected.
CONCLUSION
Incentive trusts address a parent’s final dilemma, but do not fix it.
Incentive trusts developed out of unique American inheritance laws and
have become a regarded estate planning tool. Policy, observation, and
research suggest that they are inadequate, although still uncritically used.
A Hidden Bonus Trust is an improved solution that builds on the short-
comings of incentive trusts. Hidden Bonus Trusts quench parents’ desires
to leave legacies and motivate troubled beneficiaries. If Mr. Shapira used
a Hidden Bonus Trust to inspire Daniel to marry a Jewish woman, the
story might have ended with “Mazel Tov,” rather than Daniel diminish-
ing his father’s fortune in legal battles.
297 See supra Part IV.A.
